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UTILIZING THE FOURTH OPTION: EXAMINING THE 
PERMISSIBILITY OF STRUCTURED DISMISSALS THAT DO 
NOT DEVIATE FROM THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S 
PRIORITY SCHEME 
ABSTRACT 
Following a § 363 asset sale, the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with 
three options to close its chapter 11 case: (1) request confirmation of a 
liquidation plan; (2) convert the chapter 11 case to a chapter 7 case; or (3) 
request dismissal of the case. There is a fourth option, however: a structured 
dismissal. Structured dismissals are controversial because the Code does not 
expressly provide for them. Opponents thus equate structured dismissals with 
impermissible sub rosa plans. Existing caselaw does not provide a clear 
answer as to whether courts have the discretionary authority, under the Code, 
to authorize structured dismissals. In 2015, the Third Circuit was the first 
Court of Appeals to grant a structured dismissal settlement. In approving the 
structured dismissal, the court also held that, in rare instances, a structured 
dismissal can deviate from the priority scheme in § 507. Through the 
structured dismissal, the Third Circuit engineered a mechanism for parties to 
evade the mandatory priority scheme. 
This Comment argues that while the Third Circuit had the statutory 
authority to grant a structured dismissal, the court did not have the authority, 
statutory or otherwise, to approve a dismissal that deviated from § 507. This 
Comment takes the position that the Code’s priority scheme applies to all 
estate distributions in a chapter 11 proceeding, including a structured 
dismissal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Like most legal proceedings, a number of administrative fees encumber 
bankruptcy filings.1 To circumvent costly proceedings that do not maximize 
the value of a bankruptcy estate, select bankruptcy courts have approved 
structured dismissals in chapter 11 cases.2 A structured dismissal is a cross 
between a dismissal and a confirmation order, which dismisses a chapter 11 
case with additional pre-determined provisions.3 Structured dismissals are 
typically consensual agreements between the debtor and some, if not all, of the 
creditors.4 
In a standard chapter 11 proceeding, the parties first propose a plan of 
reorganization.5 The plan must meet certain requirements under § 1129 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).6 If the plan satisfies § 1129, the bankruptcy 
court will approve the plan.7 When the plan is substantially fulfilled, the court 
closes the case with no additional strings attached.8 This dismissal returns the 
debtor to its pre-bankruptcy status.9 
 
 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2012). Specifically under § 1930(a)(3), “[t]he parties commencing a case under 
title 11 shall pay to the clerk of the district court or the clerk of the bankruptcy court, if one has been certified 
pursuant to section 156(b) of this title, the following filing fees: . . . (3) For a case commenced under chapter 
11 of title 11 . . . $1,167.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS (2011), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (“The courts are 
required to charge a $1,167 case filing fee and a $550 miscellaneous administrative fee.”). 
 2 See, e.g., In re Felda Plantation, LLC, No. 9:11-bk-14614-BSS., 2012 WL 1071671 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 26, 2012) (granting a structured dismissal because of consensual agreement between debtor and 
creditors); see also Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and 
Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (June 2010) http://www.coleschotz.com/ 
2B7963/assets/files/News/293.pdf (noting that, as late as 2010, “cases involving structured dismissals ha[d] 
not yet resulted in memorandum decisions (published or unpublished), [but] there ha[d] been a number of 
rulings that are useful to understanding how structured dismissals have been . . . viewed by courts”). 
 3 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 270 (2014).  
 4 See In re Felda Plantation, 2012 WL 1071671 (granting a structured dismissal because of a consensual 
agreement between debtor and creditors). All parties were placed on notice of the structured dismissal motion 
and no one objected. Id.; see also Charles M. Ollerman & Mark G. Douglas, Taking a Stand Where Few Have 
Trodden: Structured Dismissal Held Clearly Authorized by the Bankruptcy Code, JONES DAY, Sept./Oct. 2014, 
http://www.jonesday.com/taking-a-stand-where-few-have-trodden-structured-dismissal-held-clearly-
authorized-by-the-bankruptcy-code-10-01-2014/. 
 5 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.  
 6 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012). The court will only confirm a consensual plan that meets all of the 
requirements prescribed in part (a) of § 1129. Id. § 1129(a). 
 7 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4. 
 8 Id.  
 9 11 U.S.C. § 349. 
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Pre-negotiated asset sales under § 363 serve as an alternative to the 
standard chapter 11 process.10 A § 363 sale allows a debtor to liquidate most, if 
not all, of its assets free of existing liens and interests.11 Following a § 363 sale, 
a debtor has a handful of options to finalize its chapter 11 case.12 Debtors most 
commonly utilize one of the following three options: (1) request confirmation 
of a liquidation plan; (2) convert the chapter 11 case to a chapter 7 case; or (3) 
request a dismissal of the case.13 
More recently, courts have allowed debtors and creditors to utilize 
structured dismissals as a fourth option.14 Structured dismissals are particularly 
appealing to debtors that have disposed of assets through a sale because the 
dismissals are less costly and typically more expeditious than proposing and 
confirming a reorganization plan.15 Structured dismissals are controversial, 
however, because they are not expressly provided for under the Code.16  
Two notable opponents of structured dismissal are the United States 
Trustee (“UST”) and the American Bankruptcy Institute.17 In the wake of the 
growing popularity of structured dismissals, the UST co-authored and 
published an article that delineated several objections to such dismissals.18 The 
UST primarily argued that structured dismissals fail to afford parties with the 
protections provided in a standard confirmation process and therefore “strongly 
resemble impermissible sub rosa plans.”19 Additionally, the American 
 
A dismissal of a case – (2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered, under 
section 522(i)(1), 542, 550, or 553 of this title; and (3) revests the property of the estate in the 
entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case 
under this title. 
 10 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4. 
 11 Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. Distefano, The Mechanics of a § 363 Sale, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 
(Feb. 2011), http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/4dbdca20-38ed-4d4c-bc04-a637b7a6997d/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/962b73fc-20b1-4652-88a3-a8b84134f4b8/blocks%202-11.pdf. 
 12 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4. 
 13 Id.; Pernick & Dean, supra note 2.  
 14 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2. 
 15 In re Petersburg Regency LLC, 540 B.R. 508, 532 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (noting that granting the 
structured dismissal would prevent more “expensive litigation . . . .”). 
 16 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 270. 
 17 Amir Shachmurove, Another Way Out: Structured Dismissals in Jevic’s Wake, NORTON BANKR. L. 
ADVISER 1 (Thomson Reuters, Saint Paul, Minn.), Nov. 2015, Westlaw, 2015 No. 11 Norton Bankr. L. 
Adviser NL 1. 
 18 Lisa L. Lambert, Nan Roberts Eitel & T. Patrick Tinker, Structured Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed 
Outside of Code’s Structure?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (Mar. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
ust/legacy/2011/07/13/abi_201103.pdf; Shachmurove, supra note 17.  
 19 Lambert, Eitel & Tinker, supra note 18, at 20.  
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Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 released 
a lengthy report suggesting that Congress amend the Code to clarify that 
structured dismissals are impermissible.20 
In 2015, the Third Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to approve 
structured dismissals in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT 
Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.).21 Prior to the appeal, a 
New Jersey trucking company filed for bankruptcy.22 Following the debtor’s 
§ 363 sale, the trucking company and select creditors agreed upon a settlement 
that dictated how they would disperse the remaining assets of the company.23 
The bankruptcy court approved the settlement and dismissed the case, even 
though the agreement intentionally left out a class of priority claimants.24 The 
neglected claimants appealed.25  
Two issues were presented on appeal in In re Jevic.26 First, does a chapter 
11 case dismissal always amount to a “hard reset”?27 In other words, does a 
dismissal always return the debtor to its prebankruptcy status, or does the court 
have discretion to issue any additional requirements or provisions attached to a 
chapter 11 case dismissal?28 In approving structured dismissals, the court 
reasoned that a dismissal does not have to amount to a hard reset.29  
Second, is it permissible for a structured dismissal settlement to deviate 
from the Code’s priority scheme under § 507?30 The court held that structured 
dismissals may deviate, but only in rare instances.31 
 
 20 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 272–73; see also Shachmurove, 
supra note 17. 
 21 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 22 Id. at 176. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  
 25 Id. at 179. 
 26 Id. at 175. 
 27 Id. at 181. 
 28 Id.  
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 175. 
 31 Id. The “rare instances” the Third Circuit noted will depend on the facts of each case. In In re Jevic, 
for example, the court found that the structured dismissal was the “least bad alternative” because there was “no 
prospect” of a plan being confirmed and conversion to chapter 7 would have resulted in the secured creditors 
taking their collateral “in short order.” Id. at 185. In In re Petersburg Regency LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of New Jersey found “the instant case is stronger than Jevic because all creditors, except the 
Harmons, are receiving a distribution and the ‘class-skipping’ issue which figured in Jevic is not present here.” 
540 B.R. 508, 532 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015). The court also noted four other factors that constituted the requisite 
“rare instances”: (1) no classes are being skipped; (2) dismissing the case now would prevent “many more 
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Keeping in mind that one of the Code’s core goals is to maximize the value 
of an estate, bankruptcy parties must seek creative options to resolve chapter 
11 cases.32 This Comment proceeds in two parts and examines the 
permissibility and necessity of structured dismissals that do not deviate from 
the Code’s priority scheme. First, this Comment defends the proposition that 
structured dismissals are permissible under the Code. Second, this Comment 
addresses the current split between the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding the 
applicability of §§ 507 and 1129 of the Code to settlement agreements.33 After 
careful analysis, this Comment contends that §§ 507 and 1129 apply to 
settlement agreements in the context of structured dismissals. 
I. FRAMEWORK 
This section of the Comment provides an overview of the seminal In re 
Jevic case and structured dismissals in four parts. First, it recounts the facts and 
Third Circuit’s holding in In re Jevic. Next, it describes what structured 
dismissals are and how they work by outlining the types of remedies that 
derive from structured dismissals. Then, this section explains the three 
standard options to finalize a chapter 11 case provided by the Code. Finally, 
this section concludes by explaining the Code’s priority scheme.  
A. Highlighting the Case: In re Jevic Holding Corp. 
In 2006, Sun Capital Partners acquired Jevic Transportation, Inc., a New 
Jersey trucking company, in a leveraged buyout.34 A group of lenders, led by 
CIT Group, funded the acquisition.35 CIT gave Jevic an $85 million line of 
 
months or years of continuing and expensive litigation . . .;” (3) the secured claims “far exceeded” the value of 
the collateral; and (4) no realistic possibility of a reorganization or conversion to chapter 7 existed. Id.  
 32 See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991); In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 186. 
 33 Compare In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 186 (permitting a structured dismissal that deviated from the Code’s 
priority scheme), with In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984) (determining the settlement was 
not “fair and equitable” for two reasons: (1) it placed a junior creditor's interest before that of the government’s 
senior interest; and (2) the approval was not “informed” because the value of the estate was based on “guesses 
and conjecture”), and Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 
478 F.3d 452, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding the settlement agreement was not an impermissible sub rosa 
plan of reorganization because the agreement was in the best interest of the estate). 
 34 In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 175. “A leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition of another company using a 
significant amount of borrowed money (bonds or loans) to meet the cost of acquisition. The assets of the 
company being acquired are often used as collateral for the loans, along with the assets of the acquiring 
company.” Leveraged Buyout–LBO, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/ 
leveragedbuyout.asp (last visited March 11, 2016). 
 35 In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 175. 
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credit, conditioned upon Jevic maintaining at least $5 million in assets and 
collateral.36 In the following years, Jevic’s business continued to plummet; by 
May 2008, Jevic’s board of directors agreed to file for chapter 11.37 Jevic 
ceased operations and notified its employees of their immediate termination.38 
At the time of filing, Jevic owed over $73 million to both its first priority 
secured creditors (CIT and Sun Capital) and its general unsecured creditors.39 
An official committee was developed to represent the unsecured creditors.40 
The committee sued the secured creditors for fraudulent conveyance, claiming 
that Sun Capital, with funds from CIT, acquired Jevic with improper 
projections of profitability.41 Additionally, a group of terminated Jevic 
employees filed a class action suit against the secured creditors and Jevic 
because Jevic did not provide its employees with the requisite sixty-day notice 
of termination prior to layoffs, as required by the New Jersey Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN Act”).42 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware partially 
granted and partially denied Jevic’s motion to dismiss the fraudulent transfer 
suit. The court held that the secured creditors’ acquisition of Jevic constituted 
both a fraudulent transfer and preferential transfer under §§ 547 and 548;43 
however, the secured creditors’ actions did not constitute a fraudulent transfer 
under § 544.44 The ex-employees obtained a similar mixed result in their 
WARN Act suit.45 The court entered a ruling against Jevic because it 
determined that Jevic fell within the WARN Act’s definition of “employer.”46 
The court granted the secured creditors’ summary judgment motion, however, 
because it determined that the secured creditors did not fall within this same 
definition.47  
Following the court’s ruling, the committee, secured creditors, terminated 
employees, and Jevic’s board of directors met to negotiate a settlement for the 
 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. at 175–76. 
 39 Id. at 176. 
 40 Id.  
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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fraudulent conveyance suit.48 The committee concluded that a settlement was a 
more desirable solution in light of Jevic’s limited remaining assets ($1.7 
million in cash).49 In the interim between the original bankruptcy filing date 
and the settlement agreement meeting, Jevic liquidated its assets.50 The final 
terms of the settlement agreement allocated Jevic’s remaining $1.7 million to 
taxes, administrative creditors, and unsecured creditors.51 Specifically, the 
settlement accomplished four things: 
(1) The involved parties would exchange releases of their claims 
against each other, and the fraudulent conveyance action would be 
dismissed with prejudice; 
(2) CIT would pay $2 million into an account earmarked to pay 
Jevic’s and the committee’s legal fees and other administrative 
expenses; 
(3) Sun Capital would assign its lien on Jevic’s remaining $1.7 
million to a trust, which would pay tax and administrative creditors 
first and then the general unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis; and 
(4) Jevic’s chapter 11 case would be dismissed.52 
Notably, the agreement did not provide for any distribution to the drivers 
(Jevic’s ex-employees), even though they had an uncontested WARN Act 
claim.53 The drivers argued that a portion of the claim was a priority wage 
claim under § 507(a)(4), and their claim was entitled to a higher priority than 
the tax and unsecured creditors’ claims.54  
The ex-employees rejected the settlement because creditors of a lower 
priority received the remaining Jevic assets.55 The court ignored the 
employees’ objection and approved the settlement agreement.56 The court 
dismissed the case as a structured dismissal, conditioned on the parties’ 
execution of the terms of the settlement agreement.57 
 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. at 177. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. at 178. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.  
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B. How Structured Dismissals Work 
Generally, before a party may file a motion for a structured dismissal to 
conclude its bankruptcy case, a § 363 sale occurs.58 Section 363 sales are 
increasingly used by debtors that wish to sell substantially all of their assets 
instead of attempting to restructure through the chapter 11 process.59 Under 
§ 363, the debtor or a court appointed trustee may sell any asset in which the 
debtor has a legal or equitable ownership interest at the beginning of the 
bankruptcy case.60 Anyone except the trustee or an officer of the court may 
purchase assets from the sale.61  
There are two types of § 363 sales: those made (1) in the ordinary course of 
business; or (2) outside the ordinary course of business.62 Allowing the sale of 
property conducted in the ordinary course of business enables the debtor to 
continue operations while in bankruptcy as long as the court approves the 
sale.63 In contrast, the sale of property conducted outside the ordinary course of 
business requires notice and hearing.64 Notice and hearing is a prerequisite to 
the sale’s approval because it provides creditors the opportunity to object.65 If 
there are no timely objections, the § 363 sale may proceed.66 If there are 
objections to the sale, the court will conduct a hearing and determine whether 
the sale is appropriate.67 
Debtors generally utilize structured dismissals if one of three scenarios 
occurs following a § 363 asset sale: (1) the debtor is unable to pay 
administrative debts or fund a chapter 11 plan; (2) the debtor has sufficient 
funds from the asset sale to fund a chapter 11 plan, but doing so would 
significantly drain the available funds for creditor distribution; or (3) the debtor 
has remaining assets after a § 363 sale and creditors agree to negotiate an out-
 
 58 John Kane, Structured Dismissals – How They Work Part I: Court Authority for Alternative Ending, 
INSOLVENCY INSIGHTS BLOG (Sept. 22. 2014), http://insolvencyinsights.com/2014/09/22/structured-dismissals-
how-they-work-part-i-court-authority-for-an-alternative-ending/. 
 59 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2.  
 60 Philip A. Schovanec, Comment, The Sale of Property Under Section 363: The Validity of Sales 
Conducted Without Proper Notice, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 489, 495 (1993). 
 61 Id. at 494. 
 62 Id. at 496. 
 63 Id. at 496–97. 
 64 Id. at 496. 
 65 Id. at 498. 
 66 Id. at 499. 
 67 Id.  
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of-court agreement to administer the remaining assets.68 The purpose of each 
scenario is to demonstrate that there are insufficient post-363 sale assets to 
make necessary payment distributions to creditors and fulfill a chapter 11 
reorganization plan.69 
For the court to grant a structured dismissal, the movant must demonstrate 
a cause for dismissal.70 The three aforementioned scenarios are sufficient 
reasons to establish cause.71 A structured dismissal goes beyond a standard 
chapter 11 dismissal.72 While a standard chapter 11 dismissal will simply end 
all court proceedings,73 a structured dismissal will end all court proceedings 
and contain varying “bells and whistles,” such as the orders, settlements, and 
provisions that continue to govern the dismissal.74 
1. Structured Dismissal Remedies 
The facts and desired outcome of a case will determine what bells and 
whistles are included in a structured dismissal. As previously discussed, a 
structured dismissal does not simply dismiss a bankruptcy case. Instead, courts 
utilizing structured dismissals will dismiss cases and mandate additional 
requirements for the parties to fulfill—i.e., bells and whistles. Typically, bells 
and whistles fall into at least one of four categories: (1) release and exculpation 
provisions; (2) claims reconciliation processes and distribution procedures; (3) 
carve-outs and “gift” trusts; and (4) enforceability of prior orders and retention 
of jurisdiction.75 
 
 68 Peter M. Sweeney, Delaware Views from the Bench–Structured Dismissals, 4 BLAKELY & BLAKELY 
Q. (Winter 2014), http://www.bandblaw.com/newsletter/archived/2014WinterBBQuarterly.pdf; see also JAY 
R. INDYKE, ET AL., STRAFFORD, CHAPTER 11 STRUCTURED DISMISSALS: VIABLE EXIT STRATEGY OR 
IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE? (2014), http://media.straffordpub.com/products/chapter-11-
structured-dismissals-viable-exit-strategy-or-impermissible-under-bankruptcy-code-2014-10-
28/presentation.pdf.  
 69 JAY R. INDYKE, ET AL., supra note 68.  
 70 Kane, supra note 58.  
 71 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 2. 
 72 Kane, supra note 58.  
 73 U.S. BANKR. COURT CENT. DIST. OF CAL., Dismissal, Conversion & Closing of A Bankruptcy Case, 
What are the Differences Between Them?, http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/faq/dismissal-conversion-closing-
bankruptcy-case-what-are-differences-between-them (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
 74 Kane, supra note 58; Sweeney, supra note 68. 
 75 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 2.  
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a. Release and Exculpation Provisions 
The first category of relief that courts provide through structured dismissals 
eliminates the debtor’s risk of potential future obligations by adding either 
release provisions or exculpatory provisions to the final court order.76 Both 
provisions relieve parties from liability on a claim.77 These provisions are 
either specific to one or more certain, identified claims or apply more broadly 
to cover potential claims.78  
Release provisions discharge a party within a suit from another related or 
non-related pending course of action.79 They are commonly found in settlement 
agreements where parties mutually agree to settle one claim in exchange for a 
release from another pending suit.80 The following boilerplate release provision 
of a settlement agreement illustrates how comprehensive these provisions can 
be: 
Each Party hereby fully, finally, and forever releases and discharges 
the other Party, and any and all of its respective past, present, and 
future affiliates from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, 
demands, damages, debts, losses, costs, expenses, attorney fees or 
other liabilities of every kind and nature whatsoever; whether legal or 
equitable and whether known or unknown, arising out of, resulting 
from, or relating to, in any manner, the Action, the claims and causes 
of action that were or could have been asserted relating to the Action, 
or any facts or circumstances related to the Action.81 
Exculpatory provisions prevent a party from pursuing a legal claim against 
another party that it otherwise could assert.82 Though parties are generally free 
to devise their own terms of a release or exculpatory provision, parties cannot 
 
 76 In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc., 534 B.R. 416, 419 (Bankr. D. Utah 2015) (“The Settlement 
Agreement also provided that customary release and exculpation provisions will be included in the order 
resolving the case.”). 
 77 See, e.g., In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 266 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (outlining the provisions of the 
structured dismissal, which included releasing the trustee from any liability connected to the chapter 11 case); 
In re Strategic Labor, Inc., 467 B.R. 11, 17 n.10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (listing provisions commonly found 
in structured dismissal agreements and the controversy associated with them). 
 78 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 3.  
 79 See In re Biolitec, 528 B.R. at 266. 
 80 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Settlement Agreement Between FDIC and PCMG, April 2011, 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/plsa/oh_amtrust_bank_cleveland_1.pdf. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See In re Century Elecs. Mfg., Inc., 345 B.R. 33, 34 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); Neal J Suit, 
Understanding the Differences Between Indemnity and Exculpatory Clauses, CAPITAL (2013), http://www. 
ccsb.com/pdf/Publications/RealEstate/Differences_Between_Indemnity_and_Exculpatory_Clauses.pdf. 
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create provisions that will limit their liability in a manner that violates the law 
or is against public policy.83  
b. Reconciliation Process 
In a structured dismissal order that contains reconciliation provisions, a 
party’s objective is to reconcile claims in a speedy and cost-effective fashion.84 
The reconciliation orders will often contain provisions similar to those found in 
chapter 11 confirmation plans.85 The reconciliation process requires the debtor 
to compare creditors’ claims with its own records to confirm or reject 
inconsistencies between claims filed by creditors and the debtor’s schedule of 
liabilities.86 This process is necessary because some creditors will file invalid 
or inflated claims.87 
After a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the debtor is required to submit a 
schedule of assets and liabilities.88 The schedule outlines the debtor’s current 
assets and debts owed to creditors. If the debtor did not list an obligation owed 
to a creditor, that creditor must file a proof of claim to participate in a 
distribution.89 Although the Code is silent about the time period within which a 
party should file its proof of claim, a court will typically set a filing deadline, 
known as the “bar date.”90  
 
 83 See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90 (1955). The California Supreme Court devised 
an effective six criteria test to determine when contractual agreements affect public policy. Tunkl v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 102 (1963). 
 84 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 3.  
 85 Id. 
 86 See Reconciliation, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 26. 2016), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/ 
reconciliation.asp?optm=sa_v2. 
 87 Carriane J. M. Balser & Heather L. Hyde, Effective Claims Management in Bankruptcy–Planning 
Teamwork and Documentation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jul./Aug. 1998, http://www.abi.org/abi-journal/effective-
claims-management-in-bankruptcy-planning-teamwork-and-documentation. 
 88 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 1.  
 89 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012). Filing a proof of claim is permissive, but a creditor cannot participate in a 
distribution if it does not have a claim. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a), (c). Furthermore, certain claims are 
excepted from the claim filing requirement. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 501.01[3] (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
 90 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure control the timely filing of proofs of claims. See FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 3003(a). Subsection (c)(3) gives the bankruptcy court the authority to set the “bar date,” which 
courts strictly enforce. See id. 3003(c)(3); In re Analytical Sys., Inc., 933 F.2d 939, 942 n.5 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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c. Gifting 
Creditor classes utilize gifting as a mechanism to obtain consensual 
structured dismissals.91 Gifting is best illustrated by the First Circuit’s decision 
in In re SPM Manufacturing Corp.92 In that case, the debtor sold all of its 
assets in a § 363 sale because a chapter 11 reorganization was not feasible.93 
The secured creditor maintained a lien on substantially all of the debtor’s 
assets.94 Under the Code’s priority scheme, the secured creditor would receive 
all of the proceeds from the asset sale, leaving the unsecured creditors empty 
handed.95  
In an out-of-court negotiation, the secured creditor and the unsecured 
creditors’ committee agreed to cooperate in both crafting a reorganization plan 
and the remaining bankruptcy proceedings in exchange for a portion of the 
secured creditor’s proceeds.96 The agreement was beneficial to the secured 
creditor who wanted to end the costly and time-consuming bankruptcy 
proceedings without interference from the unsecured creditors.97 The debtor 
objected to the secured creditor’s motion seeking approval to distribute a 
portion of the sale proceeds to the unsecured creditors.98 The debtor argued that 
the proposed distribution improperly paid unsecured creditors before 
administrative creditors with a higher priority under § 507.99 The court 
reasoned that the secured creditor was guaranteed all available proceeds from 
the sale.100 No chance existed that the unsecured creditors or other 
administrative creditors would receive any distribution from the sale.101 
Therefore, the court concluded that creditors were free to distribute their 
bankruptcy dividends however they chose.102  
In In re SPM Manufacturing, the creditor was free to distribute a portion of 
its proceeds in consideration for the unsecured creditors’ cooperation because 
 
 91 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 1.  
 92 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 93 Id. at 1307. 
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. at 1308. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. at 1309. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id. at 1308. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 1313. 
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the proceeds belonged exclusively to the secured creditor.103 In the context of 
structured dismissals, a secured creditor may include gifting provisions in the 
dismissal agreement to induce other parties to consent to the dismissal.104 
d. Enforceability of Prior Orders and Retention of Jurisdiction 
The fourth type of relief in structured dismissal orders is retention orders. 
Notwithstanding § 349, bankruptcy courts will retain jurisdiction over matters 
even after they dismiss a case.105 Retention provisions are useful in structured 
dismissals because they authorize a specific court to implement the dismissal 
order, resolve any subsequent matters, or both.106 If the court adds a retention 
order, the court will retain jurisdiction over the matter even after it has 
dismissed the case. Without retention provisions, the previous orders and 
judgments in the bankruptcy case are vacated under § 349.107  
C. Exit Strategies 
The Code expressly provides three options for a debtor to exit a chapter 11 
case: (1) confirming a reorganization plan; (2) converting the case from 
chapter 11 to chapter 7; or (3) dismissing the case with no additional bells and 
whistles. Each option is briefly discussed in the following subsections. 
1. Confirmation of a Reorganization Plan  
A debtor’s chapter 11 plan details its reorganization strategy so it can keep 
its business alive and repay creditors.108 Businesses can utilize one of two types 
of reorganization strategies: (1) reduce payments to creditors while extending 
the payment time frame and laying off employees; or (2) cancel existing 
purchase orders.109 A court is likely to confirm a chapter 11 plan that is feasible 
 
 103 Id.  
 104 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 58. 
 105 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4. 
 106 Id. 
 107 BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKRUPTCY TREATISE, pt. 1, ch. 41, at 7 (D. Michael Lynn et al. eds., 2016), 
www.bloomberglaw.com/content/bankruptcytreatise; see 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(2) (2012) (“Unless the court, for 
cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under section 742 of this title—(2) vacates any order, 
judgment, or transfer ordered, under sections 522(i)(1), 542, 550, or 553 of this title.”). 
 108 United States Courts, Chapter 11-Bankruptcy Basics, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/ 
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basic (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
 109 How Cases Move Through Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/ 
autoframe?openagent&nav=menu4c&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/263?opendocument (last visited Aug. 28, 
2016). 
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and in the best interests of the debtor’s creditors.110 Any proposed chapter 11 
plan must comply with §§ 1123 and 1129 of the Code, among others.111 
Requirements for the content of a chapter 11 plan are enumerated in 
§ 1123.112 The plan provisions in subsection (a) are mandatory, whereas the 
provisions in subsection (b) are discretionary.113 Under subsection (a), the plan 
must specify the classes of claims (i.e., secured or unsecured), detail the 
treatment for each class, and provide plausible means to implement the plan.114 
The Code’s plan confirmation requirements are enumerated in § 1129.115 
Subsections (a)(1) through (6) and (a)(11) through (13) pertain to the plan 
itself and stipulate the necessary elements required to confirm a plan.116 For 
example, (a)(3) requires the plan be proposed in good faith.117 The remaining 
sections pertain to the treatment of classes of claim or interest holders.118  
With respect to structured dismissals, the most significant requirement is 
§ 1129(a)(8).119 Under this provision, each class of claims or interests must 
vote to accept the proposed reorganization plan.120 A collectively accepted plan 
is called a consensual plan.121  
If all the requirements in § 1129(a), except (a)(8), are met, the court may 
still confirm the plan so long as it is fair and equitable.122 This type of plan is a 
nonconsensual plan.123 The Supreme Court held, “[t]he words ‘fair and 
equitable’ are terms of art—they mean that ‘senior interests are entitled to full 
priority over junior ones.’”124 “[N]o class may participate in distribution under 
 
 110 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), (11); see also Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 58.  
 111 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 58. 
 112 11 U.S.C. § 1123. 
 113 BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKRUPTCY TREATISE, supra note 107, pt. V, ch. 172. 
 114 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1), (3), (5). 
 115 Id. § 1129. 
 116 John D. Ayer, Michael L. Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, Chapter 11-“101”: Confirming a Plan, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.-Jan 2005, at 16. 
 117 11 U.S.C. § 1129. 
 118 Ayer, Bernstein & Friedland, supra note 116, at 16. 
 119 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). 
 120 See id. § 1129(a)(7). 
 121 In re United Marine, 197 B.R. 942, 948 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 122 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 
 123 In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 599 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 
 124 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984) (first citing SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 
379 U.S. 594, 612 (1965); then citing Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441 (1968)). 
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the plan unless classes having priority are compensated in full.”125 This concept 
is commonly referred to as the absolute priority rule.126 Essentially, the 
absolute priority rule reinforces the policies underlying the bankruptcy priority 
scheme codified in § 507.127  
2. Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 Conversion 
The goal of chapter 11 is reorganization, whereas, the goal of chapter 7 is 
liquidation and the fair treatment of creditors.128 Under § 1112, a debtor may 
convert a chapter 11 case unless one of three scenarios exists: “(1) the debtor is 
not a debtor in possession; (2) the case originally was commenced as an 
involuntary case under [chapter 11]; or (3) the case was converted to a case 
under [chapter 11] other than on the debtor’s request.”129 Upon conversion to a 
chapter 7 case, the court appoints a trustee to take control of liquidating the 
remaining assets and distributing the proceeds among creditors.130 Because a 
court-appointed trustee immediately takes control of the estate in a chapter 7 
case, the debtor has a limited role in the remainder of the process.131 The debtor 
in chapter 7 primarily wants to retain property that is exempt from liquidation 
and receive a discharge for any remaining debts.132 
3. Dismissal with No “Bells and Whistles” 
When a bankruptcy court dismisses a case, the court and adversary 
proceedings related to the case cease.133 Dismissals can occur voluntarily (at 
the debtor’s request) or involuntarily (at the request of the creditors or sua 
sponte).134 Section 1112(b) discusses the framework for chapter 11 dismissals. 
 
 125 9D AM. JUR. 2d BANKR. § 2978. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). Confirmable nonconsensual plans must still satisfy all requirements under 
§ 1129(a), except (a)(8). Id. Section 1129(a)(9) mandates that a reorganization plan must satisfy § 507 to be 
confirmable. Id. § 1129(a)(9). 
 128 See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The policy of equality 
among creditors as articulated by IAM may be of significance in liquidation cases under Chapter 7, however, 
the paramount policy and goal of Chapter 11, to which all other bankruptcy policies are subordinated, is the 
rehabilitation of the debtor.”). 
 129 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a). 
 130 John B. Newman, Conversion of a Bankruptcy From Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, NEWMAN & SIMPSON, 
LLP, http://www.newmansimpson.com/conversion-of-a-bankruptcy-from-chapter-11-to-chapter-7.html (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 UNITED STATES BANKR. COURT CENT. DIST. OF CAL., supra note 73. 
 134 Id. 
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The party requesting a chapter 11 dismissal must prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that sufficient cause to dismiss the case exists.135 Section 
1112(b)(4) list sixteen permissible causes for dismissal;136 courts may, 
however, consider other factors and dismiss a case at their discretion.137  
Once cause is established and the court dismisses the case, the debtor is 
returned to its prebankruptcy status.138 This type of dismissal has no bells and 
whistles. In other words, there are no additional proceedings or tasks for the 
debtor to follow or tasks for the debtor to complete related to its bankruptcy 
case.139 Dismissal releases the debtor’s estate from the court’s control and 
allows creditors to resume attempts to collect any owed debt from the debtor.140 
D. Bankruptcy Priority Scheme 
Section 1129(a)(9) requires that a reorganization plan must satisfy § 507 to 
be confirmable.141 Section 507, the bankruptcy priority scheme, dictates the 
order that claims are paid.142 The bankruptcy priority scheme is analogous to a 
ladder where each rung represents a priority level.143 Section 507 lists the 
mandatory asset distribution order based on class priorities.144 Bankruptcy 
prioritizes repayment in full to claim holders based upon their position on the 
ladder; claim holders positioned higher up on the ladder will be paid in full 
before lower positioned claim holders.145  
There are two major categories of claims: “secured” and “unsecured.”146 
Secured claims give the claim holder the right to collect its debt from a specific 
 
 135 BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKRUPTCY TREATISE, supra note 107, pt. V, ch. 165. 
 136 11 U.S.C § 1112(b)(4) (2012). 
 137 In re Charles St. Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church of Bos., 499 B.R. 66, 112 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013). 
 138 Bankruptcy Dismissal, THIS MATTER, http://thismatter.com/money/credit/bankruptcy/dismissal.htm 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2016). 
 139 See id. 
 140 Id.; see also Monica S. Blacker, Michael P. Cooley & Vickie Driver, Structured Dismissals: The Least 
Worst Option, DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION: BANKRUPTCY & COMMERCIAL LAW SECTION (Nov. 5 2014), 
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/2024.pdf. 
 141 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9). 
 142 See id. § 507. 
 143 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 507.02 (“The preferred categories of claims are 
designated as having priority over other categories of claims and are entitled to payment in full before those 
not granted priority.”). 
 144 11 U.S.C § 507. 
 145 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 507.02. 
 146 See id. ¶ 507.02[4][a]. 
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piece of property.147 If a debtor pledges a piece of its property as collateral 
when he or she incurs the debt, the claim is voluntary.148 In contrast, claim 
holders can create involuntary claims by obtaining a lien on a debtor’s property 
through a court order.149  
Unsecured claims are debts not protected by a security interest in the 
debtor’s property.150 Examples of unsecured claims include medical bills, 
credit card bills, and cash advance loans. If a debtor does not pay its unsecured 
debts, the creditor does not have the authority to collect its debt from a specific 
piece of the debtor’s property.  
Secured claims are not included in the priority scheme ladder because the 
nature of a secured claim allows the claim holder to recover its debt directly 
from a specific piece of property.151 Unsecured claims, however, are positioned 
in hierarchal order in accordance with the priority scheme.152 The remaining 
unsecured claims are arranged in descending order of priority according to 
§ 507.153  
II. DISCUSSION 
Part II begins with an analysis of the permissibility of structured dismissals 
under the Code, followed by a discussion of when structured dismissals are 
appropriate. This Comment concludes with an examination of the competing 
circuit court views on whether structured dismissals are allowed. 
 
 147  See id. (“A lien is a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance 
of an obligation.”). Common types of secured claims are mortgages and car loans. For example, if a debtor 
does not make the necessary payments on a car loan, the claim holder has the power to repossess the car and 
sell it to repay the debt. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See id. ¶ 507.02[3][a][i]. 
 150 Unsecured claims are representative of the claims assessed under § 507. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) 
(2012); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 507.02[4][a] (“The priorities granted by section 507 are 
priorities as against holders of unsecured claims only.”). In drafting the priority scheme, Congress decided that 
domestic support obligations should hold the highest priority amongst unsecured claimants. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 507(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
 151 James H. Barnhill, The Conundrum of an Inadequately Protected Secured Creditor, 97 COM. L.J. 367, 
369 (1992). 
 152 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 507.01. 
 153 See id. 
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A. The Code Allows Structured Dismissals 
The Code does not explicitly provide bankruptcy courts with the power to 
grant structured dismissals.154 As a result, structured dismissals are a by-
product of courts’ and parties’ creativity. Parties seeking a structured dismissal 
invoke §§ 1112(b), 305(a)(1), 349(b), and 105(a) for statutory validation.155 A 
plain reading of these sections provides ample support for structured dismissals 
under the Code. Furthermore, the legislative intent of § 349 confirms 
Congress’s desire to provide courts with the discretion to implement creative 
judgments within the bounds of the Code. 
The court’s statutory authority to grant a dismissal, structured or not, is 
derived from § 1112(b).156 To obtain a dismissal under § 1112(b), the debtor 
must demonstrate cause.157 If a debtor successfully demonstrates cause, the 
court must dismiss the case, absent unusual circumstances identified by the 
court.158 To justify cause for a structured dismissal, debtors can assert that there 
 
 154 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 155 Blaire Cahn, In re Jevic Holding Corp. Part I: Third Circuit Authorizes Structured Dismissals in 
Limited Circumstances, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (June 30, 2015), https://business-finance-restructuring. 
weil.com/rules-and-procedures/in-re-jevic-holding-corp-part-i-third-circuit-authorizes-structured-dismissals-
in-limited-circumstances/. 
 156 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012). Specifically, the language of this section reads: 
Except as provided in paragraph (2) and subsection (c), on request of a party in interest, and after 
notice and a hearing, the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 or 
dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, for 
cause unless the court determines that the appointment under section 1104(a) of a trustee or an 
examiner is in the best interests of creditors and the estate. 
Id. 
 157 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 1112.04[6]. 
 158 In re Hinesley Family Ltd. P’ship, No. 1, 460 B.R. 547, 551 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011). Specifically, the 
court noted: 
Although section 1112(b) does not define the phrase “unusual circumstances,” it clearly 
contemplates conditions that are not common in most chapter 11 cases. Although each chapter 11 
case is to some extent unique, and unusual circumstances may exist in any particular case 
regardless of its size or complexity, the import of section 1112(b) is that, if cause exists, the case 
should be converted or dismissed unless unusual facts or circumstances demonstrate that the 
purposes of chapter 11 would be better served by maintaining the case as a chapter 11 
proceeding. 
Id.; accord Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 442, 
119 Stat. 23. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 amended § 1112(b) to 
clarify that courts must grant a dismissal where cause is adequately demonstrated. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) 
(2012) (emphasis added). Obtaining a dismissal is a bifurcated process. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 89, ¶ 1112.04[7]. Step one requires debtors to demonstrate cause, and step two allows courts to 
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is a “substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the 
absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation” or an “inability to 
effectuate substantial consummation of a plan.”159 For example, the debtors and 
creditors in In re Jevic agreed that a structured dismissal was a more 
appropriate strategy than continuing bankruptcy proceedings.160 A dismissal 
was more desirable to the parties because continuing bankruptcy proceedings 
would only drain the value of the debtor’s limited remaining assets.161 A 
dismissal is typically an appropriate strategy for debtors that have either 
liquidated a majority of their assets, do not have the necessary assets to 
proceed with a confirmation plan, or both.162  
As discussed in Part I supra, structured dismissals can occur after a § 363 
asset sale.163 Under § 1112(b), courts typically grant a dismissal, structured or 
otherwise, after a § 363 sale because the debtor has liquidated most of its assets 
and cannot consummate a reorganization plan.164 
Section 305(a)(1), while traditionally applied in involuntary bankruptcy 
cases, serves as another source of justification for structured dismissals.165 
Involuntary bankruptcy cases often arise when creditors involved in out-of-
court restructuring negotiations force a debtor into bankruptcy to obtain more 
desirable treatment.166 Section 305(a)(1) grants the court the authority to 
dismiss a case at any time if “the interests of creditors and the debtor would be 
better served by such dismissal or suspension.”167 Courts generally perceive 
§ 305(a)(1) dismissals as an extraordinary remedy because they are final 
judgments not eligible for appellate review.168 
 
consider if granting the dismissal is in the best interest of creditors and the estate. Rollex Corp. v. Associated 
Materials, Inc. (In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc.), 14 F.3d 240, 242 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 159 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b); accord Camden Ordnance Mfg. Co. of Ark. v. U.S. Trustee (In re Camden 
Ordnance Mfg. Co. of Ark.), 245 B.R. 794, 799–800 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that a dismissal is appropriate 
where the debtor’s assets have been liquidated and there are no assets to reorganize); Ollerman & Douglas, 
supra note 4; Kane, supra note 58.  
 160 787 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 161 Id. at 176–77. 
 162 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 57.  
 163 See Part I.B supra. 
 164 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(M). 
 165  See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 305.02. 
 166 11 U.S.C. §§ 303, 305(a)(1) (2012); Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.  
 167 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1). 
 168 Id. § 305(c): 
An order under subsection (a) of this section dismissing a case or suspending all proceedings in a 
case, or a decision not so to dismiss or suspend, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the 
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In conjunction with §§ 1112(b) and 305(a)(1), proponents of structured 
dismissals rely on § 105(a) to extend the court’s dismissal authority. Section 
105(a) permits bankruptcy courts to “issue any order, process, or judgment that 
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Code.169 “Thus, 
§ 105(a) appears to grant bankruptcy courts authority to approve structured 
dismissals, because §§ 305 and 1112 of the Code provide means for dismissing 
cases.”170 Sections 105(a) does not, however, give the court the authority to 
issue orders inconsistent with the Code.171 The Supreme Court in Law v. Siegel 
held that “a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions 
[of the Code].”172 Section 105(a), therefore, allows courts to issue structured 
dismissal orders pursuant to §§ 1112(b) or 305(a)(1).  
In re 155 Route 10 Associates illustrates the court’s willingness to approve 
structured dismissals so long as they do not conflict with the Code. In In re 155 
Route 10, the debtors sought a structured dismissal, citing § 105(a).173 The 
trustee objected, and argued that because structured dismissals are not 
expressly permitted by the Code, they are prohibited.174 The court disagreed, 
and granted the debtor’s structured dismissal pursuant to § 105(a).175 
While §§ 1112(b), 305(a)(1), and 105(a) govern courts’ authority to issue 
dismissal orders, § 349 discusses the effect of a dismissal. Section 349(b) gives 
courts discretion to deviate from a standard dismissal “for cause”;176 however, 
the ways in which courts have interpreted “for cause” varies, as illustrated by 
the two decisions in In re Sadler and In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc.177  
The Seventh Circuit in In re Sadler defined “cause” as “an acceptable 
reason,” based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.178 The 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah in In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc., 
 
court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of title 28 or by the Supreme Court of the 
United States under section 1254 of title 28. 
 169 Id. § 105(a); accord Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014). 
 170 Kane, supra note 58. 
 171 Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. at 1194; In re Fesco Plastics Corp., 996 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding § 105 allows courts to “enforce the provisions of the Code, not to add on to the Code as they see fit”).  
 172 134 S. Ct. at 1194. 
 173 2012 WL 3570157. 
 174 Id.  
 175 Id.  
 176 11 U.S.C. § 349 (2012); In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Naartjie 
Custom Kids, Inc., 534 B.R. 416, 422 (Bankr. D. Utah 2015).  
 177 See, e.g., In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Naartjie, 534 B.R. at 422. 
 178 935 F.2d at 921. 
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however, began its analysis of § 349 by looking to the plain language of the 
statute.179 The court held that § 349(b) is unambiguous because it clearly reads, 
“unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of the case . . .”180 
Under this interpretation of the statute, a bankruptcy court is not bound to 
ordering a dismissal that solely discharges the parties and closes the case.181 
The legislative intent of § 349 is also parallel with the literal writing of the 
statute.182 The House Report enumerates the effects of dismissal and states, 
“the court is permitted to order a different result for cause.”183 
B. Under What Circumstances Is a Structured Dismissal Appropriate? 
The Third Circuit in In re Jevic refrained from deciding the question of 
whether structured dismissals are allowed if a confirmable chapter 11 plan or 
chapter 7 conversion is possible.184 The court did not need to answer the 
question because there was no prospect of the debtors proposing a confirmable 
chapter 11 plan with the limited remaining assets in the estate.185 Opponents of 
structured dismissals argue that debtors will use this type of dismissal to 
circumvent plan confirmation or conversion processes.186 To prevent this 
practice, the court serves as a safeguard against a debtor’s ability to abuse 
structured dismissals.187 Though dictum, the Third Circuit noted that “absent a 
 
 179 534 B.R. at 422; Kane, supra note 58.  
 180 Id. at 422.  
 181 See id.; see also In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2015).  
 182 In re Naartjie, 534 B.R. at 422.  
 183 Id. at 423 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 338 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6294).  
 184 787 F.3d at 182.  
 185 Id. at 181–82.  
 186 See Lambert, Eitel & Tinker, supra note 18, at 20.  
 187 See In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (“Courts serve as a safeguard against 
abuse by rejecting plans and dismissals that circumvent the protections allotted in the Bankruptcy Code.”). In 
re Biolitec serves as a more recent example of courts serving as a safeguard. 528 B.R. 261. The court in In re 
Biolitec rejected a motion for an entry of an order dismissing the debtor’s chapter 11 case pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 305(a), 349, and 1112(b) and a settlement agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. Id. at 272. The debtor’s settlement and structured dismissal proposed that the 
Debtor’s chapter 11 case would be dismissed pursuant to § 1112(b); however, the Court would retain 
jurisdiction over the two adversary proceedings that were pending  in the case, the claims reconciliation and 
objection process, and all matters related to the Liquidating Trust. Id. The settlement further stated: 
 
(1) With the exception of any potential interest of the estate in the Massachusetts Action, the 
Trustee will contribute all remaining estate assets to the Liquidating Trust. The estate will 
relinquish and assign any interest it has in the Massachusetts Action (or in any new action 
commenced by AngioDynamics against the Non-Debtor Affiliates to collect on its 
Judgment Claim) to AngioDynamics, although AngioDynamics will contribute a portion of 
any recovery obtained in these actions (up to $2,000,000) to the Liquidating Trust. 
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showing that a structured dismissal has been contrived to evade the procedural 
protections and safeguards of the plan confirmation or conversion processes, a 
bankruptcy court has discretion to order such a disposition.”188 Courts normally 
reject any resemblance of a plan, settlement, or dismissal order that aims to 
circumvent the standard chapter 11 proceedings because of the judicially–
created concept of sub rosa plans.189 
In a sub rosa plan, “a chapter 11 debtor constructs a broad settlement that 
amounts to a de facto plan of reorganization, which enables a debtor to 
restructure its debt while bypassing many of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
fundamental creditor protections.”190 Section 1129 provides four significant 
and fundamental protections: (1) the right of impaired creditors to vote on a 
proposed plan;191 (2) the requirement of good faith;192 (3) best interest of 
 
(2) AngioDynamics will fund the formation of the Liquidating Trust and make additional 
contributions for the payment of allowed administrative expense claims. AngioDynamics 
will also contribute any interest it might have in the real property that is the subject of the 
CeramOptec Proceeding to the Liquidating Trust. 
(3) Development Specialists, Inc. (“DSI”) will be appointed as the liquidating trustee 
(“Liquidating Trustee”). AngioDynamics will serve as trust advisor to DSI and “provide 
direction or consent to all significant actions of the Liquidating Trust.”  
(4) The Liquidating Trustee will be substituted for the Trustee in the two pending adversary 
proceedings and any other action commenced by the Trustee. The Liquidating Trustee will 
also be substituted for the Trustee to oversee the claims reconciliation and objection 
process. AngioDynamics will be joined as a party to these actions and pursue them for the 
benefit of the Liquidating Trust. 
(5) All claims of the Non-Debtor Affiliates will be subordinated to all allowed claims. 
(6) The Trustee will be released from any liability in connection with the chapter 11 case. 
Id. at 265–66 (numerals added). The court declined to grant the order because the debtor did not demonstrate 
that the proposed settlement and dismissal were in the best interests of the estate and its creditors. Id. at 270. 
“[I]n the absence of the consent of all parties, the Court is precluded from approving a settlement that alters 
parties’ rights but ignores many of the Code’s most important creditor protections.” Id. at 272. 
 188 In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 182. 
 189 In re Biolitec, 528 B.R. at 261 (denying the chapter 11 trustee’s motion for a structured dismissal 
because it sought to “alter parties’ rights without their consent and lacks many of the Code’s most important 
safeguards”). 
 190 Del. Tr. Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holdings, LLC (In re Energy Future Holding Corp.), 527 
B.R. 157, 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015). 
 191 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8), (10) (2012). 
 192 Id. § 1129(a)(3). 
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creditors;193 and (4) the feasibility test.194 These protections ensure that 
creditors are on notice by the proposed plan.195  
In re Braniff Airways Inc. was the first case to conceptualize a sub rosa 
plan.196 The debtor, Braniff Airways, Inc., filed for bankruptcy under chapter 
11 in May 1982.197 In turn, the FAA promulgated a special regulation to 
mitigate the effect of Braniff Airways’s termination and bankruptcy.198 The 
FAA allocated Braniff Airways’s four hundred landing slots amongst various 
other airline carriers.199 The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee then questioned 
whether the FAA’s allocation of the slots interfered with Braniff Airways’s 
property.200 The bankruptcy court and FAA responded by stipulating that the 
slots would be returned “should Braniff or an air carrier succeeding to the 
rights, duties and obligations of Braniff begin operations.”201 
In December 1982, Braniff Airways proposed a settlement agreement to the 
bankruptcy court.202 Under the settlement agreement, the debtor would transfer 
cash, landing slots, and equipment to Pacific Southwest Airlines in exchange 
for profit participation in future Pacific Southwest Airlines operations.203 The 
settlement also specified that future profits would be issued to only Braniff 
Airways’s employees, shareholders, or a limited amount of unsecured 
creditors.204 In a separate stipulation agreement designated for Braniff 
Airways’s creditors, the debtor developed provisions that required secured 
creditors “to vote a portion of their deficiency claim in favor of any future 
reorganization plan approved by a majority of the unsecured creditors’ 
committee.”205After a month of oral arguments from interested parties, the 
 
 193 Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
 194 See id. § 1129(a)(11); Craig A Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditors 
Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 41–42 (1999). The Emory Bankruptcy Developments 
Journal published without the name of the sponsoring school until 2004. 
 195 Sloane, supra note 194, at 40. 
 196 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Kimon Korres, Note, Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing 
Chapter 11 Protections Through Manipulation of the Business Justification Standard in § 363 Asset Sales, and 
a Refined Standard to Safeguard Against Abuse, 63 FLA. L. REV. 959, 964 n.50 (2013). 
 197 In re Braniff Airways, 700 F.2d at 938.  
 198 Id.  
 199 Id. Landing slots are specific timeframes given to airlines for departing and arriving aircrafts. Id. at 
940. 
 200 Id. at 938. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id.  
 203 Id. at 939.  
 204 Id.  
 205 Id. at 940. 
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bankruptcy court entered its order approving the Braniff Airways and Pacific 
Southwest Airlines settlement agreement.206 
On review, the court held that the settlement agreement was null because it 
dictated future provisions of a reorganization plan.207 For example, if devised 
according to the settlement agreement, any future reorganization plan would 
have to allocate the profits to a limited group of creditors.208 According to the 
court, Braniff was not allowed to “short circuit” the chapter 11 confirmation 
process for a reorganization plan by predetermining profit allocations.209 
Additionally, the stipulation agreement disenfranchised creditors during the 
reorganization plan process.210 
In re Braniff Airways serves as a pillar for the notion that courts should not 
confirm any plan, settlement, or dismissal order that effectively encroaches on 
the protections and proceedings in the Code. In bankruptcy proceedings, a 
structured dismissal is only appropriate when the debtor can adequately show 
that confirming a plan or converting a chapter 11 case would be overly 
burdensome.211 Otherwise, the structured dismissal will highly resemble a sub 
rosa plan, thus constituting a tactic to circumvent the explicit exit strategies.212  
Ultimately, chapter 11 confirmation plans are preferred in comparison to 
structured dismissals because they give debtors the opportunity to reorganize 
their business while simultaneously repaying creditors.213 Chapter 11 to chapter 
7 conversions, when in the best interest of creditors and the estate,214 are also 
advantageous because the remaining estate assets are liquidated and distributed 
according to the Code’s priority scheme.215 As the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of New Jersey noted, “[i]f a chapter 11 case could be dismissed solely 
to avoid additional expenses associated with liquidating the estate, parties 
 
 206 Id. at 938. 
 207 Id. at 940. 
 208 Id. at 939. 
 209 Id. at 940. 
 210 Id.  
 211 Brent Weisenberg, Expediting Chapter 11 Liquidating Debtor’s Distribution to Creditors, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2012, at 36, 106.  
 212 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012) (listing the requirements to confirm a plan); id. § 1112 (a)–(b) (listing the 
requirements to either convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 case or dismiss a case).  
 213 FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 109, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?openagent&nav= 
menu1&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/201. 
 214 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.  
 215 Lambert, Eitel & Tinker, supra note 18, at 20. 
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would rarely, if ever, convert to chapter 7 and the conversion option in section 
1112(b) would essentially be rendered superfluous.”216 
In consideration of the Third Circuit’s dictum in In re Jevic and the § 1129 
requirements for plan confirmation, a structured dismissal, specifically one in 
the form of a settlement agreement, is not appropriate where a confirmable 
chapter 11 plan or chapter 7 conversion is possible. 
C. The Code’s Priority Scheme Applies to Structured Dismissal Settlements 
Caselaw divides settlements into two categories.217 The first type of 
settlement is one that is proposed as a part of a chapter 11 reorganization 
plan.218 Courts have limited discretion in approving these types of settlements 
because of the fair and equitable standard.219 Thus, any settlement proposed as 
a part of a reorganization plan must arrange the distribution of claim payments 
in accordance with the bankruptcy priority scheme.220 
The second type of settlement is an agreement parties reach outside of a 
reorganization plan.221 These types of settlements have received different 
methods of treatment from the circuit courts.222 The circuits are split on 
whether a court must apply the fair and equitable standard when considering a 
proposed nonconsensual settlement that parties formed outside of a 
reorganization plan.223  
The following sections will review the Fifth, Second, and Third Circuit 
approaches to the fair and equitable standard. This Comment will then argue 
that the Fifth Circuit’s rule is favorable, and that the fair and equitable standard 
should also apply to settlements outside of the reorganization plan; therefore, 
deviation from the Code’s priority scheme would be impermissible.  
 
 216 In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014). 
 217 Compare Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 
424 (1968), with In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 218 See In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298. 
 219 Id.; In re Jackson Brewing Co., 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 220 In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298; see 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(9) (2012). 
 221 See In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298. 
 222 Compare id., and In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2007), with In re Jevic 
Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 186 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 223 Compare In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298, and In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 466–67, with In re Jevic, 787 
F.3d at 186. 
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1. Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit in In re AWECO, Inc. was the first circuit to decide the 
applicability of the Code’s priority scheme to settlements outside of a 
reorganization plan.224 When AWECO, Inc., filed for bankruptcy in early 1981, 
it had four major creditors.225 Of these creditors, United American Car Co. held 
an unsecured claim for approximately $27 million that was the result of a 
breach of contract lawsuit.226 Litigation between AWECO and United 
American lasted for almost two years while AWECO’s chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding was pending.227 Ultimately, AWECO and United American agreed 
to settle the lawsuit.228 The terms of the settlement provided that AWECO 
would transfer $5.3 million in cash and property to United American.229 The 
settlement did not include any repayment of AWECO’s outstanding debts to its 
other three creditors.230 Notably, one of the three excluded creditors held a 
secured claim in the property that AWECO agreed to transfer to United 
American under the settlement agreement.231 
After AWECO notified the bankruptcy court of its intention to settle, its 
creditors objected.232 The creditors argued that the settlement between 
AWECO and United American was unfair.233 The court approved the 
settlement over the creditors’ objection, and the creditors appealed.234 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the bankruptcy court must 
“apply the fair and equitable standard in considering a priority creditor’s 
objections to a settlement.”235 The court declined to adopt United American’s 
argument that the fair and equitable standard does not extend to any outside 
 
 224 725 F.2d at 298; Peter Doggett Jr., What Exactly Does the Term “Fair and Equitable” Mean?, 1 ST. 
JOHN’S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. 1 (2009), http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/journals/abi/sjbrl/ 
volume/v1/doggett.stj. 
 225 In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 295. In addition to United American’s claim, the Department of Energy had 
a $45 million claim; the IRS had two priority claims totaling over $7 million; and Sutton Investments, Inc., had 
a claim for approximately $8 million. Id. 
 226 Id.  
 227 Id.  
 228 Id.  
 229 Id. at 296. 
 230 See id.  
 231 See id.  
 232 Id. at 295. 
 233 Id. at 296. 
 234 Id. at 297. 
 235 Id. at 298. This issue is narrower than simply deciding whether the fair and equitable standard applies 
to any outside settlement. See id.; see also Doggett Jr., supra note 224. 
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settlements.236 Instead, the court analyzed the policy implications of the fair 
and equitable standard:  
As soon as a debtor files a petition for relief, fair and equitable 
settlement of creditors’ claims becomes a goal of the proceedings. 
The goal does not suddenly appear during the process of approving a 
plan of compromise. Moreover, if the standard had no application 
before confirmation of a reorganization plan, then bankruptcy courts 
would have the discretion to favor junior classes of creditors so long 
as the approval of the settlement came before the plan237  
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the fair and equitable standard must apply 
because it prevents bankruptcy courts from favoring one group of creditors 
solely because a settlement is created outside the reorganization plan.238 The 
court explained that the decision to apply the fair and equitable standard was 
not to “radically restrict” bankruptcy courts from approving settlements, but 
rather to ensure that “settlements do not impose an unfair detriment on 
creditors.”239 
2. Second Circuit 
Over twenty years after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re AWECO, the 
Second Circuit adopted its own application of the priority rules to outside 
settlement agreements in In re Iridium Operating LLC.240 Iridium Operating 
LLC operated as a subsidiary of Motorola, Inc., until 1998 when it became an 
independent company.241 Iridium’s independence was short-lived; it filed for 
chapter 11 in 1999.242 Months before filing bankruptcy, Iridium borrowed 
$1.55 billion from JPMorgan Chase Bank.243 
JPMorgan asserted claims over the remaining Iridium assets, and the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors objected to the claims.244 The 
Committee also sought recourse against Motorola, alleging breach of contract, 
 
 236 In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298. 
 237  Id. 
 238 Id. (determining that if the standard had no application before confirmation of a reorganization plan, 
then bankruptcy courts would have the discretion to favor junior classes of creditors so long as the approval of 
the settlement came before the plan was proposed). 
 239 Id. at 299. 
 240 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007); Doggett Jr., supra note 224. 
 241 In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 456. 
 242 Id. at 457. 
 243 Id.  
 244 Id. at 456. 
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breach of fiduciary duty, and avoidance of fraudulent conveyances.245 Because 
the Committee did not have sufficient funds to both contest the claims and 
pursue legal action against JPMorgan and Motorola, however, the Committee 
and JPMorgan reached a settlement agreement.246 In the agreement, the 
Committee and JPMorgan proposed to divide Iridium’s remaining assets 
amongst themselves.247 Against Motorola’s objection that the settlement would 
distribute estate property to lower priority creditors before more senior ones, 
the bankruptcy court approved the settlement.248 The decision was affirmed by 
the district court, and Motorola appealed.249 
Motorola contended that the bankruptcy court improperly approved the 
settlement because it did not meet the fair and equitable standard—junior 
creditors were paid before senior creditors.250 Motorola claimed “a settlement 
can never be fair and equitable if junior creditors’ claims are satisfied before 
those of more senior claims.”251  
The court agreed that the fair and equitable standard is a requirement for 
settlements proposed within a reorganization plan, relying on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson.252 There, the Supreme 
Court held that “the requirements . . . that plans of reorganization be both ‘fair 
and equitable[]’ apply to compromises just as to other aspects of 
reorganizations.”253 The Supreme Court further distinguished that the 
established requirement applied explicitly to settlements that are a part of a 
reorganization plan.254  
Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the Second Circuit concluded 
that the settlement between JPMorgan and the Committee was not bound by 
the fair and equitable standard because it was not proposed as a part of 
Iridium’s chapter 11 reorganization plan.255 The Second Circuit noted: 
“[W]hether a particular settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the 
Code’s priority scheme must be the most important factor for the bankruptcy 
 
 245 Id. at 458. 
 246 Id. at 458–59. 
 247 Id. at 459. 
 248 Id.  
 249 Id.  
 250 Id. at 462. 
 251 Id.  
 252 Id. at 461 (citing 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968)). 
 253 TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424. 
 254 Id.; see also In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 461. 
 255 In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 463. 
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court to consider when determining whether a settlement [within a 
reorganization plan] is ‘fair and equitable . . . .’”256 The court also noted that if 
a court approves a settlement that deviates from the priority scheme, it must 
articulate its reasoning in the opinion.257 
The Second Circuit in In re Iridium applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in TMT Trailer Ferry too narrowly.258 Although TMT Trailer Ferry involved 
discussed a settlement agreement that was connected to a reorganization plan, 
the Court’s ruling covers settlements devised during a bankruptcy 
proceeding.259 The Supreme Court held that “requirements . . . that plans of 
reorganization be both ‘fair and equitable[]’ apply to compromises just as to 
other aspects of reorganizations.”260 Other aspects of the reorganizations should 
encompass structured dismissals.  
3. Third Circuit 
In In re Jevic, the Third Circuit elected to adopt the more flexible rule from 
In re Iridium.261 The court highlighted that deviations from the § 507 priority 
scheme are only permissible if the court can articulate “specific and credible 
grounds to justify the deviation.”262  
This flexible rule presents several issues, however. Primarily, the doors of 
discretion are left open for courts to create varying interpretations of “specific 
and credible grounds.” Both the Second and Third Circuits were wary of 
establishing a less rigid adaptation of the Fifth Circuit’s rule in In re AWECO, 
and for good reason.263 In his dissenting opinion in In re Jevic, Judge Scirica 
departed from the majority opinion on the grounds that the facts from this case 
did not present a credible justification to deviate from the priority scheme.264 
 
 256 Id. at 465. 
 257 Id.  
 258 See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Illinois, et al. at 9, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136 S. Ct. 
2541 (2016) (No. 15-649), 2015 WL 9315587, at *9. 
 259 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Illinois, et al., supra note 258, at 9. 
 260 TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424. 
 261 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We agree with the Second Circuit’s 
approach in Iridium . . . .”). 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. (“We admit that it is a close call . . . .”); In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 464 (“Rejection of a per se rule 
has an unfortunate side effect, however: a heightened risk that the parties to a settlement may engage in 
improper collusion.”). 
 264 In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 186 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Scirica went on to suggest a way that the court could have effectively 
unwound the case in accordance with the priority scheme: 
I recognize that if the settlement were unwound, this case would 
likely be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation in which the secured 
creditors would be the only creditors to recover. Accordingly, I 
would not unwind the settlement entirely. Instead, I would permit the 
secured creditors to retain the releases for which they bargained and 
would not disturb any of the proceeds received by the administrative 
creditors either. But I would also require the bankruptcy court to 
determine the WARN Plaintiffs’ damages under the New Jersey 
WARN Act, as well as the proportion of those damages that qualifies 
for the wage priority. I would then have the court order any proceeds 
that were distributed to creditors with a priority lower than that of the 
WARN Plaintiffs disgorged, and apply those proceeds to the WARN 
Plaintiffs’ wage priority claim. To the extent that funds are left over, I 
would have the court redistribute them to the remaining creditors in 
accordance with the Code’s priority scheme.265 
Judge Scirica’s ability to construct a viable exit strategy, despite the majority’s 
contention that there was no conceivable alternative to deviating from the 
priority scheme, reveals the dangers of an arbitrary “specific and credible 
grounds” standard.266 With the standard from In re Iridium permitting the 
court’s discretion, creditors and debtors cannot evaluate whether their case 
amounts to the level of credibility needed to deviate from the priority scheme. 
Beyond the grave confusion and arbitrariness created by the Second and 
Third Circuit’s flexible standard, the Code simply does not permit selective 
deviations from the priority scheme in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, the 
priority scheme applies to reorganization plans as well as settlements.267 
“Section 507 priorities reflect important and long-standing congressional 
judgments about what is fair and equitable in relation to the distribution of 
bankruptcy estate property.”268 When the Code was written, Congress did not 
intend, in any way, for the priorities to apply exclusively to select aspects of a 
bankruptcy proceeding.269 The purpose of priorities is to ensure that the 
 
 265 Id. at 189. 
 266 Id. at 186. 
 267 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League at 10, 
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016) (No.15-649), 2015 WL 9252251, at *10. 
 268 Id.  
 269 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 1–2, In re Jevic Holding Corp., 
787 F.3d 173 (No. 14-1465), 2014 WL 4184509, at *1–2:  
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creditors Congress deemed most vulnerable and important receive their portion 
of the estate before unsecured creditors.270 Accordingly, § 103 of the Code 
extends the priority scheme to chapters 5, 7, 11, 12, and 13.271  
Since Congress designed the priority scheme to apply to all bankruptcy 
chapters, it follows that Congress intended the priority scheme to apply to all 
estate distributions within a bankruptcy proceeding. The court in In re AWECO 
noted: “[A]s soon as a debtor files a petition for relief, fair and equitable 
settlement of creditors’ claims becomes a goal of the proceedings.”272 In other 
words, the fair and equitable standard does not suddenly appear during plan 
proposals; instead, distributing the assets in accordance with the priority 
scheme is a goal that permeates the entire bankruptcy proceeding.273 
Neither the Code nor legislative history supports applying § 507 
exclusively to reorganization plans.274 The Third Circuit’s willingness to permit 
class-skipping also creates a dangerous practice of manipulation and evasion of 
the Code. The ex-employees in In re Jevic held a perfected WARN Act claim, 
which under § 507(a)(4) entitled them to payment before other unsecured 
creditors.275 Almost seven years later, the ex-employees have yet to receive the 
unpaid wages and benefits they are entitled to under federal labor laws.276 The 
practice of select creditors constructing a settlement agreement amongst 
 
The bankruptcy court’s decision sanctions a mechanism that permits parties to distribute estate 
assets (here proceeds from the compromise of estate causes of action) in violation of the priorities 
established by the Bankruptcy Code for the payment of creditor claims. That decision 
undermines a fundamental principle of bankruptcy that the debtor’s assets will be distributed 
fairly and threatens to destroy confidence in the bankruptcy system. Moreover, there appears to 
be no reason why the . . . rationale could not be extended to permit parties to violate other Code 
requirements in the context of a settlement, so long as the bankruptcy court found that the 
settlement benefitted some of the creditors.  
 270 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note 
267, at 10 (“The Third Circuit’s decision undermines fundamental bankruptcy principles and invites 
manipulation of the bankruptcy process to eviscerate the priority rights Congress expressly conferred on those 
most in need of protection in the bankruptcy process.”). 
 271 11 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National 
Consumers League, supra note 267, at 10. 
 272 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Illinois, et al., supra note 258, at 9. 
 273 See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Illinois, et al., supra note 258, at 11. 
 274 See id. 
 275 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2015); see 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(A); see also 
Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note 267, at 
10. 
 276 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note 
267, at 7. 
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themselves that intentionally excludes other priority creditors amounts to an 
unlawful evasion of the Code.277 If courts permit this type of behavior, 
creditors can essentially bypass the priority scheme whenever the Code does 
not afford them a favorable outcome.278  
The Third Circuit described its decision to grant a settlement that deviated 
from the Code’s priorities as “the least bad alternative.”279 In summation, the 
Third Circuit reasoned that the bankruptcy court should have adopted the 
corporate respondents’ settlement proposal over the employees’ objections 
because the corporate respondents would be better off and the ex-employees 
would be no worse off.280 A bankruptcy court, however, does not have the 
discretion to grant this type of order.281 “Claims of necessity or hardship cannot 
justify approving a distribution of estate assets outside a plan in a manner that 
violates the priority scheme.”282 
In adopting the flexible standard from In re Iridium, the Second and Third 
Circuits determined that bankruptcy courts can choose when and how to apply 
the Code’s priority rules. Their understanding is incorrect. In a recently 
published student Note, Up the Chute, Down the Ladder: Shifting Priorities 
Through Structured Dismissals in Bankruptcy, the author proposed a multi-
faceted analysis for courts to use when assessing whether to approve a 
noncompliant structured dismissal.283 Some of the considerations included: 
“[W]hether and when stakeholders whose rights would be affected by the 
structured dismissal were informed of the negotiations leading up to the 
 
 277 Id. at 7 (“This represents an additional opportunity for wage theft—employers failing to pay 
employees what they have earned.”); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 6, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136 
S. Ct. 2541 (2016) (No. 15-649), 2016 WL 424790, at *6 (“Allowing debtors and select creditors to collude on 
a private deal to dispose of estate property outside this framework, in violation of the priority scheme, 
undermines those provisions and is incompatible with the Code’s structure.”). 
 278 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 277, at 2; Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law 
Project & National Consumers League, supra note 267, at 6 (“Moreover, the Third Circuit’s liberal approach 
to approving settlements in structured dismissals, creating an opportunity for the settling corporate parties to 
bypass priority creditors, is likely to encourage more, and more problematic, motions for approval of 
structured dismissals.”). 
 279 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 185 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 280 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note 
267, at 14. 
 281 See United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 229 (1996); United 
States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996); Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & 
National Consumers League, supra note 276, at 9. 
 282 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 277, at 8. 
 283 Bethany Kate Smith, Note, Up the Chute, Down the Ladder: Shifting Priorities Through Structured 
Dismissals in Bankruptcy, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2989, 3012 (2016). 
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proposed agreement; [and] whether such stakeholders received sufficient 
opportunity to participate in the negotiations.”284  
The author’s suggested considerations are strikingly similar to the flexible 
standard from In re Iridium. Both the court in In re Iridium and the author 
prioritized the absolute priority rule in deciding whether to approve a 
structured dismissal or settlement that deviates from § 507. What these 
interpretations fail to recognize is that the application of § 507 is not flexible or 
at the discretion of the court. Congress has already provided specific 
mechanisms for distributing proceeds of an estate outside of the priority 
scheme.285 Other than the exceptions provided for in §§ 364(c), 510, 724(b), 
726(a)–(b), and 901, the only permissible deviation from § 507 is with the 
consent of all creditors.286 Under § 1129, creditors are explicitly given the 
authority to waive their priority rights.287 The In re Iridium standard and 
proposed considerations in Up the Chute, Down the Ladder are therefore 
unnecessary. As the court in In re Roth American, Inc. noted, where “Congress 
intended to alter the priority scheme established in section 507, it has done so 
explicitly.”288 The Third Circuit’s decision to approve the structured dismissal 
in In re Jevic was therefore in error. None of the § 507 exceptions were present 
in the case, and the settlement was not consensual amongst all the creditors, 
namely the ex-employees. 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision falls on the correct side of the argument. 
Section 1129(b) is applicable when the parties do not agree on a proposed 
reorganization plan, but all the other requirements, enumerated in § 1129(a), 
 
 284 Id. (“A bankruptcy court, in deciding whether a structured dismissal that violates section 507 is ‘fair 
and equitable’ under Rule 9019, should pay particular attention to: whether and when stakeholders whose 
rights would be affected by the structured dismissal were informed of the negotiations leading up to the 
proposed agreement; whether such stakeholders received sufficient opportunity to participate in the 
negotiations; whether such stakeholders received adequate opportunity to be heard on their objections; the 
nature of the claims or interests that would be subordinated by the proposed agreement; the nature of the 
claims or interests that would be protected or advanced through such subordination; whether there exists a 
viable alternative to the proposed agreement; and the relative difference in payout that would result to each 
class of creditors through the alternative course of conduct.”). 
 285 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note 
267, at 9 (“Where Congress found cause for an exception, Congress specified it expressly.”). 
 286 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c); 510; 724(b); 726(a)–(b); 901 (2012); Brief of Amici Curiae National 
Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note 267, at 15; see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) 
(“[e]xcept to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a different treatment of such claim . . 
. .”). 
 287 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9). 
 288 975 F.2d 949, 956 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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are met.289 The court can confirm a nonconsensual plan so long as the plan is 
“fair and equitable.”290 The fair and equitable requirement is critical because it 
protects nonconsenting parties. For example, without the protections of 
§ 1129(b) nonconsenting parties would be strongly coerced into plans that pay 
lower priority creditors before paying more senior creditors in full. The fair 
and equitable requirement must apply to all aspects of a bankruptcy case, 
including structured dismissals, because without it, the § 507 priority scheme 
would not be implicated.291  
As previously discussed, § 507 enumerates the mandatory order in which 
assets in a bankruptcy estate are distributed.292 A court’s discretionary authority 
to deviate from the priority scheme is directly in conflict with Congress’s 
promulgation of § 507. Nowhere in § 507 does the Code provide that the 
priority scheme applies exclusively to one particular type of asset distribution 
in a bankruptcy case. To afford claimants the same § 507 protections that they 
have in reorganization plans, the absolute priority rule’s fair and equitable 
requirement must therefore apply to settlements in the context of structured 
dismissals. 
CONCLUSION 
Through statutory support, this Comment has shown that structured 
dismissals are permissible so long as they do not deviate from the Code’s 
priority rules. Under the Code, judges may grant structured dismissals where 
both confirming a chapter 11 plan and converting to chapter 7 are implausible. 
Structured dismissals are permissible so long as they abide by the provisions 
within the Code. Specifically, a settlement devised in the context of a 
structured dismissal must conform to § 507 of the Code, unless the exceptions 
provided in §§ 364(c), 510, 724(b), 726(a)–(b), 901, and 1129(b) are met. On 
review, the United States Supreme Court should affirm the permissibility of 
structured dismissals, but reject the notion that structured dismissals may 
deviate from the priority scheme. 
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